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updates from international and
internationalized criminal courts & tribunals
International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia
Karadzic on Trial
The trial of Radovan Karadzic, accused
of masterminding the most violent episode in Europe since the Holocaust, began
on October 26, 2009 at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Karadzic was the President
of Republika Srpska and Commander of
the Bosnian Serb Army during the 1992
to 1995 war in the Balkans, which caused
nearly one hundred thousand deaths and
forced approximately 2.2 million people
to flee their homes. Karadzic’s indictment lists eleven counts of genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. These charges stem from the role he
played, along with Ratko Mladic, in leading the July 1995 attacks at Srebrenica,
in which approximately 8,000 Bosnian
Muslim men and boys were slaughtered in
a UN “Safe Area.” Karadzic and Mladic
are also accused of taking UN personnel
hostage and laying siege to Sarajevo for
43 months, killing thousands of innocent
civilians.
Karadzic’s eccentricities have had a
significant effect on his trial. Karadzic was
originally indicted by the ICTY in July
1995, but did not first appear before the
court until July 31, 2008, following his capture in Serbia. He had been in hiding since
1996, most recently living in Belgrade
and, with his background as a psychiatrist,
working as an alternative healer. Initially,
he refused to recognize the authority of the
ICTY, forcing the court to enter a plea on
his behalf in August 2008. He originally
insisted on representing himself, but has
also asked the ICTY to provide paid legal
assistance. In addition, he maintains a large
staff of volunteer lawyers, researchers, former politicians, and professors.
Karadzic refused to attend the first three
days of his trial, claiming he needed more
time to prepare and review approximately
1.2 million pages of documents for his
defense. The ICTY judges warned him
repeatedly of the consequences should he
continue the boycott, and Karadzic attended

a procedural hearing on November 3, 2009.
Days later, Judge O-Gon Kwan instructed
the ICTY Registrar to assign counsel to
the accused, noting that should Karadzic
continue his boycott, the appointed counsel
would argue on his behalf. The Judge partially granted Karadzic’s requested delay,
allowing a continuance until March 2010.
So far, it appears that Karadzic is basing
much of his defense on his claim that
U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, chief
negotiator of the Dayton Accords, agreed
to grant him immunity from prosecution in
exchange for his resignation as the President of Republika Srpska in 1996.
Generally, commentators view Judge
Kwan’s decision favorably as the ICTY’s
credibility suffered during the rambling
defense of Slobodan Milosevic, who also
represented himself. Karadzic’s behavior
inspires a legitimate fear of similar repercussions. Judge Kwan’s decision is an
attempt to balance the interests of efficiency with the accused’s right to selfrepresentation. Its success will depend on
how Karadzic proceeds during the trial.

International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda
Nizeyimana Brought into ICTR
Custody
On October 5, 2009, Ugandan authorities arrested Idelphonse Nizeyimana, one
of the suspects wanted for leading and
perpetrating the Rwandan genocide in
1994. Authorities arrested Nizeyimana and
handed him over to be tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR). The tracking team for the ICTR
collaborated with Ugandan police to capture Nizeyimana, who was detained on his
way to Kenya from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Nizeyimana is the second individual
to be arrested from a list of thirteen fugitives in less than two months. He was also
tagged by the ICTR in 2000 as one of eight
key suspects in the genocide. Nizeyimana’s
initial appearance before the ICTR took
place on October 14, 2009 before Judge
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Khalida R. Khan, where he pleaded not
guilty.
Nizeyimana served as the deputy intelligence chief and captain of the Ecole des
Sous Officiers (ESO), and is suspected
of being a key organizer in orchestrating
the genocide, estimated to have killed
between half a million and a million Tutsis
and moderate Hutus. He is also suspected
of murdering Queen Rosalie Gicanda, a
respected and symbolic figure for Tutsis
in Rwanda.
The ICTR has charged Nizeyimana with
five counts of genocide and crimes against
humanity. He is alleged to have formed
secret units of soldiers to murder prominent
Tutsis, set up roadblocks to detain and kill
Tutsi civilians, given direct orders to massacre civilians, provided material support
such as grenades, transported members of
the Interahamwe (extremist Hutu militia)
to Muslim quarters to carry out attacks,
assisted in organizing the massacre at the
Butare University in 1994, and participated
in preparing lists that identified people,
mostly Tutsi intellectuals and Tutsis in
positions of authority, to be “eliminated.”
Nizeyimana had been evading arrest by
traveling under false papers. Until recently,
he is believed to have been hiding in the
jungles of eastern DRC, where he belonged
to the Hutu rebel group, Democratic Forces
for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). This
rebel group continues to commit atrocities
against civilians in the DRC. The DRC has
been criticized for failing to cooperate with
the ICTR in capturing wanted suspects; but
the arrest of Nizeyimana comes right after
an agreement was reached with the DRC
to aid in identifying other fugitives that are
suspected of hiding with the FDLR.
The ICTR would be unable to continue
its operations without third party cooperation, like that of Uganda. The ICTR’s
ability to persuade other states to assist it
is one of the reasons that an internationalized court is better equipped than national
courts to try perpetrators of the genocide.
Article 28 of UN Security Council Resolution 955 mandates state cooperation with
the ICTR in the “investigation and prosecution of those accused and indicted by
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the Tribunal.” Cooperation from states like
Uganda, the DRC, and Rwanda in evidence
gathering and coordinated investigations
is essential for the successful operation of
the ICTR.

The Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No.
ICTR-2001-70-T
On February 27, 2009, Trial Chamber II of the ICTR issued a judgment in
the case against Emmanuel Rukundo. The
accused, who served as an ordained priest
during the 1994 genocide, was accused
of crimes based on his role in abducting,
killing, and sexually assaulting Tutsis at
locations under the administration of the
Kabgayi Diocese in Gitarama prefecture
during April and May 1994. Rukundo was
convicted of genocide based on acts of killing and causing serious bodily and mental
harm that were carried out with the intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic group. He was also convicted of murder and extermination as crimes against
humanity. The Trial Chamber sentenced
Rukundo to twenty-five years in prison.
Rukundo’s conviction for genocide was
based, in part, on the killing of a Tutsi
woman named Madame Rudahunga and
for causing serious bodily harm to two of
Rudahunga’s children and two other Tutsi
civilians. The victims had taken refuge at
St. Joseph’s College in Kabgayi, the premises of which Rukundo searched together
with armed Rwandan soldiers looking for
those with links to the Inkotanyi (Tutsi
rebel army). Evidence indicated that the
soldiers abducted Madame Rudahunga and
drove to her house, with Rukundo following in another vehicle, where they shot her
to death. The perpetrators, including Rukundo, returned immediately to St. Joseph’s
and abducted the four other victims who
were taken away, brutally beaten, and left
for dead. Rukundo was later heard bragging about the killing of Rudahunga.
While the evidence did not establish
that Rukundo himself shot or beat any
of the victims, the Chamber cited the
Seromba Appeals Chamber holding that
the commission of a crime is not limited
to “direct and physical perpetration.” The
Chamber also recalled that in Gacumbitsi,
the accused was held to have committed genocide when he separated Tutsis
from Hutus prior to the killing of the
Tutsis who had been separated. In that
case, the Appeals Chamber held that the
accused’s actions were “as much an inte-

gral part of the genocide as were the
killings which [they] enabled.” The Trial
Chamber reached a similar conclusion for
Rukundo’s acts, noting that Rukundo had
participated from the outset and through
the completion of the crimes, and emphasizing that Rukundo took ownership of
the crimes by boasting later about the
killing. The Chamber went on to conclude
that Rukundo had acted with the requisite
genocidal intent, noting in particular that
Rukundo had referred to the Rudahunga
family as inyenzi (derogatory term for Tutsis, literally “cockroaches”).
The Chamber also determined that
the killing of Madame Rudahunga supported the charge of murder as a crime
against humanity, given the context of
widespread and systematic attacks against
Tutsi civilians at the time of the murder,
Rukundo’s knowledge of these conditions,
and the relationship between the murder and the systematic attacks. Citing the
Appeals Chamber in Musema, the Chamber observed that cumulative convictions
for genocide and crimes against humanity
based on the same acts are permitted since
each crime has distinct elements.
The Chamber further supported Rukundo’s conviction for genocide based on a
series of mass killings at St. Leon Major
Seminary. Evidence was adduced that on at
least four occasions in April and May 1994,
Rukundo visited St. Leon Minor Seminary
accompanied by soldiers and Interahamwe, identified Tutsis from a list, and then
departed from the Seminary. Shortly after
Rukundo’s departure, those identified refugees were abducted by soldiers and never
seen again. Citing the Appeals Chamber in
the Kayishema and Ruzindana cases, the
Trial Chamber determined that the only
reasonable inference to be drawn, given
the pervasive violence against Tutsis in
1994, was that the Tutsis abducted from the
Seminary were murdered. The Chamber
went on to reason, as it had with respect to
the finding of genocide committed at St.
Joseph’s College, that Rukundo’s conduct
at the Seminary amounted to “commission” of genocide, since his acts were
as much a part of the crimes as were the
abductions and killings they enabled. The
Chamber further determined that Rukundo
acted with intent to destroy ethnic Tutsis,
in whole or in part, given the context of
anti-Tutsi violence, and Rukundo’s statements that “something had to be done”
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about those who were sympathizing with
the Rwandan Patriotic Force.
The Chamber also reviewed allegations
of extermination as a crime against humanity based on the same evidence as that
presented for the crime of genocide. It
found there was no evidence that the Rudahunga murder, and the serious harm to her
children and the two other Tutsis, were
committed as part of killings on a mass
scale. The killings at St. Leon Seminary,
however, met the requirements for extermination, given the numerous occurrences
of abduction and the number of refugees removed (at least one busload), even
though there was no evidence adduced
of a specific number of resulting deaths.
Because the acts of extermination were
conducted as part of a systematic attack
on civilians, the Chamber was satisfied
of Rukundo’s responsibility for the crime
against humanity of extermination.
Finally, the majority of the Trial Chamber found that Rukundo’s genocide charge
was supported by evidence that he caused
serious mental harm to a Tutsi woman
through sexual assault. The relevant facts
involved a twenty-one-year-old Tutsi
woman, known as Witness CCH, who
took refuge at St. Leon Minor Seminary
around mid-May 1994. She knew Rukundo
previously and had attended his ordination. When CCH first saw Rukundo at the
seminary, she was encouraged and asked
if he could help hide her. Rukundo not
only refused, but also said that she and her
whole family had to be killed. Attempting
to ingratiate herself, CCH helped Rukundo, who was armed, carry some belongings into a small room, where she chatted
and sipped beer with him. Rukundo then
locked the door and sexually assaulted her.
The only relevant testimony on this incident came from the victim and Rukundo,
but the full Chamber determined that CCH
was credible. Moreover, the full Chamber
agreed that there was no question but
that Rukundo’s act was of a sexual nature
and that the conduct was inherently coercive, given both the general atmosphere of
Tutsi annihilation and the victim’s specific
situation of duress and intimidation. The
Chamber then went on to determine that
the victim had suffered mental harm as
a result of the assault. On this issue, the
majority of the Chamber recalled that the
relevant harm must be more than minor
but need not be permanent, that the Tribunal has previously found serious mental
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harm to be present where there is sexual
assault combined with the threat of death,
and that sexual assault has been identified
as one of the worst forms of serious harm
since it combines both bodily and mental
harm. The majority thus decided that the
only reasonable conclusion was that the
victim suffered serious mental harm, as
she was a young Tutsi woman fearing for
her life, seeking protection from a known
and trusted clergy member in a position of authority, who abused his position
and sexually assaulted her under coercive
circumstances.
Judge Seon Ki Park dissented from the
majority’s finding that Witness CCH suffered serious mental harm as a result of the
sexual assault carried out by Rukundo. In
his opinion, Judge Park stressed that Witness CCH “did not provide direct evidence
about her mental state apart from the fact
that she could not tell anyone about the
incident” and that the Prosecution “did not
even ask her how the incident has affected
her life, her mental well-being, her subsequent sexual relationships, or put any
other question to the witness which could
assist the Chamber in making this finding.” While Judge Park agreed with the
majority’s factual findings regarding the
surrounding circumstances of the assault,
he expressed “doubts that these facts rise
to the level of serious mental harm required
for a conviction of genocide,” noting that
“genocide is a crime of the most serious
gravity which affects the very foundations
of society and shocks the conscience of
humanity.”
In sentencing the accused to a prison
term of 25 years, the Chamber found Rukundo’s stature in Rwandan society to be an
aggravating factor. The Chamber found
both Rukundo’s education and his abuse of
his moral authority over trusting members
of his community, which enabled him to
further the abduction, sexual assault, and
murder of Tutsis, to be highly aggravating.

The Prosecutor v. Callixte Kalimanzira,
Case No. ICTR-05-88-T
On June 22, 2009, Trial Chamber III of
the ICTR issued its judgment in the case
against Callixte Kalimanzira, the interim
director of the Ministry of the Interior of
Rwanda. Kalimanzira was found guilty of
aiding and abetting genocide and of instigating genocide under Article 2(3)(a) of
the ICTR Statute, and of committing direct
and public incitement to commit genocide

under Article 2(3)(c). The Chamber held it
was required to dismiss the count of complicity in genocide under Article 2(3)(e) of
the Statute also included in the indictment,
as it was expressly pleaded in alternative
to the count of genocide. After judgment,
Kalimanzira was sentenced to thirty years
in prison.
The Chamber first considered the genocide charge. While it dismissed several of
the allegations made by the Prosecution
because of a lack of reliable evidence, the
Chamber was convinced that Kalimanzira
had instigated and aided and abetted genocide on multiple occasions. For instance,
the Chamber found that Kalimanzira’s failure to object to inflammatory remarks that
were made in his presence led to the killing
of Tutsi women, elders, and children. Specifically, Kalimanzira was present at the
inauguration of the new bourgmestre of the
Muganza commune in June 1994, when the
individual being inaugurated admonished
those in attendance for continuing to hide
Tutsis. Based on this evidence, the Chamber concluded that Kalimanzira knew that
the speech would instigate persons present
at the inauguration to kill Tutsis and that
this instigation was tantamount to an official sanction of such actions. The Chamber
further concluded that Kalimanzira’s presence during the speech “lent moral support
to Ndayambaje’s instigation of genocide”
and that, due to his position as a wellrespected authority figure and a native of
Muganza commune, Kalimanzira’s moral
support itself substantially contributed to
the commission of this crime. Finally,
the Chamber found that Kaliminzira had
exhibited, in the context of the inaugural
speech and elsewhere, the intent to destroy
the Tutsi group, and thus was responsible
instigating genocide.
Notably, the defense had argued that
the Chamber could not consider Kalimanzira’s “hierarchical power” in relation to
any of the allegations against him because
the Prosecutor had accused Kalimanzira
only of direct criminal responsibility under
Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute and not of
superior responsibility under Article 6(3).
Article 6(3) holds superiors responsible
for acts perpetrated by subordinates where
the superior knew or had reason to know
the subordinate would commit the act and
took no reasonable measures to prevent it
or to punish the subordinate. The Chamber
rejected this argument, stating that crimes
committed using a person’s authority were
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not limited to liability under Article 6(3),
and that the use of authority could be considered when deciding an accused’s direct
responsibility under Article 6(1). Indeed,
the Chamber noted that the Appeals Chamber has held that the Trial Chamber should,
where liability is found under both direct
and superior responsibility, convict under
direct responsibility and consider the superior position as an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, the Chamber explained
that Article 6(1) includes criminal responsibility for ordering others to commit criminal acts. Therefore, Kalimanzira’s alleged
authority could be used as evidence that he
had the power to order others to commit
such acts. Similarly, the Chamber stated
that omissions by a person of authority
could be covered under Article 6(1). For
instance, if a person has a duty act to prevent a crime and he or she did not act to
prevent it, this could be prosecutable under
Article 6(1). Therefore, the Chamber considered Kalimanzira’s position of authority and standing in the community when
analyzing the allegation that he aided and
abetted genocide through his actions at the
Muganza inauguration speech.
The Chamber further supported its holding that the accused was guilty of genocide
based on the finding that he instigated and
aided and abetted genocide at a roadblock
by (i) asking the men manning the roadblock why they had no weapons; (ii) asking
the men why they had permitted passing
Tutsis to sit nearby rather than killing
them; and (iii) providing one of the men
with a firearm, which was subsequently
used to kill nearby Tutsis. The genocide
charge was also supported by a finding that
Kalimanzira aided and abetted genocide
when in April 1994 he lured Tutsis to shelter at Kabuye Hill by promising protection
from the violence and then brought armed
men to attack them.
Turning to the charge of direct and public incitement of genocide, the Chamber
began by reviewing the relevant law, noting
the charged crime is an inchoate crime, and
therefore it is not necessary to prove that
the incitement achieved a genocidal result.
Rather, it is sufficient to establish that
an accused directly and publicly incited
the commission of genocide (actus reus),
and that he had the intent to directly and
publicly incite others to commit genocide
(mens rea). By contrast, the Chamber
noted, an accused will be guilty of committing genocide by means of instigation
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only if the instigation in fact substantially
contributed to the commission of genocide.
Another distinction between direct and
public incitement to commit genocide and
commission by instigation is that the former requires the incitement to be “public”
and “direct.” Under the jurisprudence of
the ICTR, “public” incitement means that
the statements must have been available to
the public at large. The meaning of “direct”
incitement is dependent on whether the
intended audience understood, at the time
of the act of incitement, that it was a call to
commit genocide.
Based on this law, the Chamber refused
to find Kalimanzira guilty of direct and
public incitement of genocide for alleged
statements made at a meeting of a “crisis
committee.” The meeting was not open
to the general public and did not meet the
requirement that the incitement be “public.” The Chamber also declined to make a
finding of direct and public incitement of
genocide based on allegations relating to
statements made by Kalimanzira at a football field, since the men he spoke to could
not say for certain whether he was telling
them to kill Tutsis or simply to be more
vigilant in their own defense. However, the
Chamber did find Kalimanzira guilty of
direct and public incitement of genocide
for a speech he made at a primary school
during which he thanked those in attendance for doing all they could to get rid of
“the enemy” and instructed them to continue to search for “enemies” hidden in the
bush or in people’s homes. The Chamber
noted that witnesses present at the speech
understood that “enemy” meant any Tutsi,
and that therefore the speech amounted to
a direct call to genocidal action.

Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia
International Co-Investigating Judge
of the ECCC Accused of Bias
Allegations of corruption and bias are
not new to the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the
hybrid international criminal court established to try former members of the Khmer
Rouge. However, such allegations have
traditionally involved Cambodian members of the Court. This trend changed in
mid-October 2009, when defense lawyers
for one of the four defendants currently
before the ECCC filed motions to have

the international Co-Investigating Judge,
Marcel Lemonde, removed from the case
on accusations of bias.
Lemonde is one of two judges who have
an obligation to investigate the charges
that the prosecutors bring to the ECCC
and then decide if there is enough evidence to go forward with the case. The
Co-Investigating Judges are required to
remain impartial during the investigation
process. This neutrality is crucial, as the
defense is not permitted to conduct its own
investigations, and the prosecution cannot
investigate after its initial submissions.
The current accusations of bias have
arisen in Case 002, the second case to
come before the ECCC. Recently, Judge
Lemonde has summoned six high-ranking
members of the current Cambodian government, including the presidents of the
Senate and National Assembly, to testify
as witnesses in Case 002, a move which
has incited criticism from Prime Minister
Hun Sen.
These allegations arose from a sworn
statement by Wayne Bastin, a former chief
of the Intelligence and Analysis Unit of
the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges,
that during a meeting at Lemonde’s home,
Lemonde stated his preference that investigators “find more inculpatory evidence
than exculpatory evidence” in the pending case against the former Khmer Rouge
leaders.
Lawyers for the defendant Ieng Sary
have filed a motion for Lemonde to be
removed from the case, and lawyers for
defendant Khieu Samphan said they would
file a similar motion. These motions will
then go to the Pre-Trial Chamber for consideration. ECCC spokesman Lars Olsen
said that Lemonde “does not wish to
comment on the allegations,” but would
“provide the Pre-Trial Chamber with all
necessary information.” In order to remove
the judge, the defense would have to prove
there is a “systemic bias” in favor of the
prosecution; one possibly biased comment
alone would not suffice.
If Lemonde is removed, his previous
investigative work would still remain valid
under the Court’s internal rules. The reserve
international Co-Investigating Judge, Siegfried Blunk, would take this case if Lemonde were to be removed. If the allegations
are proven true and the Pre-Trial Chamber
decides that Lemonde should be removed
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from the case, the legitimacy of the ECCC
will be damaged at a time when it is
already struggling with funding, concerns
about victim participation, and corruption
allegations.

International Criminal Court
ICC Grants Interim Release to
Bemba
On August 14, 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) granted Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo
(Bemba) interim release pending his trial
in 2010. A first for the ICC, Bemba’s
release reveals the difficulties for the ICC
when it relies on States Parties to implement its decisions.
Bemba is the first detainee to be
charged for war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed in the Central African
Republic. Bemba was the alleged president
and commander of the Mouvement de
Liberation du Congo as well as the former
vice president of the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) and a senator in its Parliament. In June 2009, five of the eight counts
brought against Bemba were confirmed
and the ICC determined the case could
proceed to trial. Pursuant to the Statute for
the ICC (Rome Statute), Judge Ekaterina
Trendafilova ruled on Bemba’s release
in August determining that he no longer
fulfilled continued detention requirements
under Article 58(1) of the Rome Statute.
Article 58(1) requires that a defendant
remain in custody:
(i) to ensure his or her appearance
at trial;
(ii) to ensure he or she does not
obstruct or endanger the investigation or court proceedings; and
(iii) to prevent him or her from continuing with the commission of the
same or related crimes which arise
out of the same circumstances in the
present case.
While Bemba has powerful connections
in both the DRC and Europe, his continued political aspirations and his complete
cooperation with the restrictions placed
on him while attending his father’s funeral
persuaded Judge Trendafilova that he was
no longer a flight risk and could be allowed
conditional release. The Chamber’s ruling
cannot be implemented, however, unless
a state consents to accept Bemba. The
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charges based on new evidence at any time Cyrena Khoury, a J.D. candidate at the
during the trial. The Chamber also ruled Washington College of Law, covered the
that it can suspend the hearing to give ICTY for this issue of the Human Rights
parties time to prepare for trial on the addi- Brief.
tional charges, and that parties will have
Shubra Ohri, a J.D. candidate at the
a right to re-examine previous witnesses,
Washington College of Law, covered the
call new witnesses, and present new eviICTR for this issue of the Human Rights
dence in light of the new charges. Both
Brief.
the Defense and the Prosecutor appealed
the Chamber’s ruling, arguing that adding
Sharon Mills, a volunteer with the War
new charges would be unfair to the accused
Crimes Research Office who has practiced
Without cooperation from States Parand could extend the trial for several more
criminal law and lectured on remedies for
ties, the ICC’s authority is undermined.
months, delaying future trials at the ICC.
grave human rights violations, wrote the
Under Article 86 of the Rome Statute,
The trial has been suspended until the
judgment summary of The Prosecutor v.
States Parties have an obligation to cooperAppeals Chamber resolves this issue.
Rukundo for the Human Rights Brief.
ate with the conditional release of defenThe Regulation 55(2) appeal highlights
dants; however, according to the Coalition
for the International Criminal Court, “the several issues facing the ICC. One chal- Amanda Chace, a J.D. candidate at the
Assembly of States Parties, which is the lenge is determining the victims’ role, Washington College of Law, wrote the
main oversight body of the ICC, has fallen compared to that of the prosecution and judgment summary of The Prosecutor v.
well short of ensuring that states parties defense. The ICC is the first international Callixte Kalimanzira for the Human Rights
are ready and willing to cooperate with all court to statutorily permit victims to par- Brief.
requests for cooperation.” Interim release ticipate independently from the prosecufor defendants awaiting trial is vital to tion and defense. The Rome Statute grants Aileen Thomson, a J.D. candidate at the
ensuring a fair trial and protecting the the Court discretion to allow victims to Washington College of Law, covered the
ICC’s image as an unbiased venue. With- present their concerns “in a manner which ECCC for this issue of the Human Rights
out the full and immediate cooperation of is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with Brief.
States Parties, the ICC will be unable to the rights of the accused and a fair and
provide fair, impartial justice for defen- impartial trial.” However, as the Lubanga Rebecca Williams and Sarah Steinfeld,
dants or victims. Bemba’s release has been application itself points out, Regulation 55 J.D. candidates at the Washington College
suspended on appeal, but if the ruling is fails to indicate which parties may request of Law, covered the ICC for this issue of
the Human Rights Brief.
affirmed, its execution will depend on that the Court exercise this discretion.
the ICC’s ability to persuade or command
Another challenge is the Chamber’s
Katherine Anne Cleary, Assistant Director
cooperation from States Parties.
extension of the jura novit curia principle,
of the War Crimes Research Office at the
under which a judge is allowed to indepenImpact of Regulation 55 on ICC
Washington College of Law, edited the
dently re-characterize the charges based on
Proceedings
judgment summaries for the Human Rights
existing facts. Through its interpretation
Brief.
On January 26, 2008, Thomas Lubanga
of Regulation 55(2), the Chamber widely
became the first defendant tried at the ICC.
departs from this principle, allowing new
Lubanga was allegedly the president of the
facts and evidence to be introduced to
Union of Congolese Patriots and the comsupport new charges at any time during
mander of its military. He has been charged
the trial.
with two counts of war crimes for conFinally, the present appeal slows the
scripting child soldiers to further the war in
the DRC. The ICC is now considering the Lubanga trial, which has already been
participating victims’ application to add plagued by extensive delays. After delaycharges of inhumane treatment and sexual ing the trial for a year after the initial filing
slavery against Lubanga under ICC Regu- of charges, the Court has again delayed
lation 55. The treatment of the victims’ the trial pending the Regulation 55(2)
application highlights several challenges appeal. If the Appeals Chamber affirms
Trial Chamber I’s decision, the trial will
faced by the new court.
be delayed once more to give the parties
Trial Chamber I responded to the vicsufficient time to prepare for new charges.
tims’ application on July 14, 2009, stating
These delays as well as the Chamber’s
that the Court could include additional
procedural decisions have brought new
charges against Lubanga. The Chamber
attention to the inner workings of the new
held that Regulation 55(2) allows it to add
Court, specifically the ability of victims
and judges to shape the proceedings. HRB
ICC has requested that Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Portugal, or South Africa
accept Bemba while he awaits trial. The
state that receives him will then have
the responsibility of supervising him and
ensuring he returns for his trial. Despite
the ICC’s requests, each of the six States
Parties have raised objections to accepting
him, and without a host country, the ICC
cannot release Bemba.
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